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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 A prisoner brought this action pro se against prison 
officials, alleging that by repeatedly opening properly marked 
incoming legal mail outside of his presence, those officials had 
violated his constitutional rights.1  Holding that defendants 
enjoyed qualified immunity because the law in this area was 
unsettled in our circuit, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the officials.  Plaintiff appeals. 
 
 I. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1331.  Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
                     
 
   1Plaintiff also named Attorney General Janet Reno as a 
defendant and alleged two state law negligence claims against all 
defendants.  On appeal, he mentions the dismissal of neither the 
state law claims nor the federal claims as to Attorney General 
Reno, and hence we need not reach these issues.  We note in any 
event that (a) the district court held that tort claims against 
federal employees may arise only under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346; and (b) to be liable for a constitutional 
violation a defendant must have some causal connection to the 
wrongdoing.  Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, ___ F.3d ___, 1995 WL 
138433, at *18 and n.13 (3d Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 
362, 377 (1976).  Plaintiff has offered no evidence that the 
Attorney General in any way caused, consented to, or tacitly 
approved the conduct of the prison officials herein. 
  
 Plaintiff Polyns Bieregu is incarcerated at the federal 
prison in Fairton, New Jersey.  He alleges that on numerous 
occasions and outside his presence, prison mailroom employees 
opened and read mail addressed to him from federal judges, in 
violation of the Constitution, federal regulations, and internal 
Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") guidelines.   
 The federal regulatory framework for handling prisoner mail 
is straightforward.  The regulations distinguish between incoming 
"general mail," which the Warden must open and inspect and may 
read, and incoming "special mail," which the Warden may open 
"only in the presence of the inmate for inspection for physical 
contraband and the qualification of any enclosures as special 
mail."  28 C.F.R. §§540.14(a), 540.18(a).2  Special mail includes 
incoming mail from federal and state courts.  §540.2(c).  In 
order to receive the special handling, incoming special mail must 
be marked "Special Mail - Open only in the presence of the 
inmate" and have a clearly identified sender.  §§540.2(c), 
540.18(a).  According to a BOP Policy Statement, however, mail 
"from the chambers of a federal judge . . . should be given 
special handling," even when it lacks the precise marking.  
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement No. 5265.08 (October 
1, 1985), §13(a).  For convenience, we will refer to 
correspondence between an inmate and attorney as "attorney mail" 
and to correspondence between an inmate and a state or federal 
                     
    
2Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to federal 
regulations are to 28 C.F.R. 
  
judge, clerk's office, or other courthouse address as "court 
mail."  We use the phrase "legal mail" as a general term 
including both attorney and court mail. 
 Plaintiff does not attack the general BOP scheme for 
handling mail, nor the specific authority of BOP employees to 
open incoming legal mail in his presence.  Rather, plaintiff 
contends that in repeatedly opening court mail outside his 
presence, the mailroom employees violated his rights to 
"confidential and uncensored commications" [sic] and to "access 
to the court" under the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  As approved in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), plaintiff sues 
directly under the Constitution. 
 In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
plaintiff supplied evidence that five pieces of mail from federal 
judges were opened outside his presence within a three month 
period.  The mail concerned civil proceedings to which plaintiff 
was a party.  Plaintiff alleges further that on another occasion, 
the mailroom employees opened and damaged a scheduling order in a 
civil forfeiture proceeding.  Bieregu claims that because the 
order was damaged, he failed to file a timely brief and his 
appeal was dismissed. 
 An internal review by the prison determined that on at least 
three of the five alleged occasions, mailroom employees did open 
plaintiff's properly marked legal mail outside his presence.  The 
employees claim they did not read the mail and submitted 
affidavits denying they had opened it intentionally. 
  
 The district court concluded "we cannot say that a 
reasonable trier of fact would be compelled to find that 
defendants' actions were the result of mere negligence."  Bieregu 
v. Reno, No. 94-2775, slip op. (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 1994), at 5.  It 
went on to conclude that "a policy or practice of opening 
properly identified legal mail outside the presence of the 
inmate" is a constitutional violation.  Id. at 9.  Nevertheless, 
the court determined that because the law in this circuit is not 
clearly established as to whether such conduct rises to the level 
of a constitutional violation, the officials were entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
 Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment 
is plenary.  In re City of Philadelphia Litigation, ___ F.3d ___, 
1995 WL 88161, *15 (3d Cir. 1995).  We consider whether there are 
genuine issues as to material facts and whether defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(c).  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); 
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 
1987).  In so determining, we will resolve all reasonable doubts 
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party.  Meyer v. Riegel Products Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307, n.2 
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1091 (1984). 
 
 II. 
 By definition a sentence of imprisonment involves a loss of 
one's liberty, and by necessity a substantial loss of one's 
privacy.  Yet confinement does not result in the forfeiture of 
  
all constitutional rights.  Indeed, the closing of the prison 
gates upon an inmate is punishment enough in most instances, and 
any attempt to isolate inmates completely from the outside world 
might not only violate their constitutional rights, but would 
disserve the interests of a society hoping to release prisoners 
to become law-abiding citizens.  Thus the Supreme Court has 
reminded us that "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating 
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."  Turner 
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).  See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron curtain drawn 
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country").  Nor 
do those walls "bar free citizens from exercising their own 
constitutional rights by reaching out to those on the 'inside.'"  
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). 
 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that persons 
convicted of serious crimes and confined to penal institutions 
retain the right to petition the government for the redress of 
grievances, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); the right to 
be free from racial segregation, Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 
(1968); the right to due process, Wolff, supra; the right of free 
speech, Abbott, 490 U.S. at 410, n.9; the right of meaningful 
access to the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); 
and the right to exercise substantial religious freedom, Cruz v. 
Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342, 348 (1987). 
 The Court has also recognized, however, that the rights of 
prisoners "must be exercised with due regard for the 
  
'inordinately difficult undertaking' that is modern prison 
administration."  Abbott, 490 U.S. at 407 (quoting Turner, 482 
U.S. at 85).  Prison officials must weigh the need for internal 
order and security against the rights of prisoners, as well as 
the constitutional rights afforded "those on the 'outside' who 
seek to enter that environment, in person or through the written 
word."  Abbott, 490 U.S. at 407. 
 Courts have been called upon to review the balance struck by 
prison officials between the penal institution's need to maintain 
security within its walls and the rights of prisoners and non-
prisoners.  As former Chief Judge Higginbotham has written for 
our court, "'courts have learned from repeated investigation and 
bitter experience that judicial intervention is indispensable if 
constitutional dictates--not to mention considerations of basic 
humanity--are to be observed in the prisons.'" Peterkin v. 
Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1033 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring)). 
 Against this background we turn to the conduct of defendants 
regarding plaintiff's incoming court mail. 
 
 III. 
 The district court granted summary judgment on the grounds 
that defendants enjoyed qualified immunity, but before reaching 
this issue we must first determine whether plaintiff has alleged 
a constitutional violation.  In re City of Philadelphia, ___ F.3d 
at ___, 1995 WL 88161, at *15; Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 
231 (1991).  This analysis involves two steps: determining (1) 
  
whether any of plaintiff's constitutional rights are infringed by 
the conduct alleged herein; and if so, (2) whether that 
infringement rises to the level of a constitutional violation, 
given the specialized standard of review applied to prison 
regulations and practices. 
 A number of courts of appeals have determined that opening 
properly marked incoming attorney or court mail outside a 
prisoner's presence, or reading such mail, infringes the 
Constitution.  Though finding a constitutional violation, the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits identified no right in 
particular.  See Castillo v. Cook County Mail Room Department, 
990 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (allegation that 
prison officials opened three pieces of incoming court mail 
outside inmate's presence states "colorable claim" of 
constitutional violation); Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465, 1468 
(11th Cir. 1991) (prison official violated prisoner's 
"constitutional right not to have his mail read" where one piece 
of incoming attorney mail opened and read in inmate's presence); 
Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(allegations that prison officials had deliberately and 
repeatedly opened incoming and outgoing attorney mail outside 
prisoner's presence sufficient to defeat officials' motion for 
summary judgment).  The Sixth and Tenth Circuits looked to the 
First Amendment.  See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 609-10 
(6th Cir. 1993) ("opening/reading" incoming court mail outside 
prisoner's presence in arbitrary or capricious fashion violates 
First Amendment); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 582 (10th Cir. 
  
1980) (opening outgoing court and attorney mail outside presence 
of inmate violates the First Amendment), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1041 (1981).  The Second Circuit also relied on the First 
Amendment, but on the Petition Clause in particular.  See 
Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(allegation that prison officials repeatedly opened outgoing 
attorney mail states claim for violation of rights to petition 
and to correspond with legal counsel).  The Fifth Circuit relied 
on a constitutional right of access to the courts, arising under 
the Due Process Clause.  See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 
475 (5th Cir. 1976) (prisoner's right of access "requir[es] that 
incoming prisoner mail from courts . . . be opened only in the 
presence of the inmate").  Taylor, however, may no longer be good 
law in the Fifth Circuit.  See Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 
825 (5th Cir. 1993) (opening incoming attorney or court mail 
outside inmate's presence does not violate prisoner's rights to 
free speech or court access), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 
S.Ct. 1081 (1994); Walker v. Navarro County Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413 
(5th Cir. 1993).  Lastly, in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Reinhardt 
has argued in dissent that the right to privacy was at stake.  
Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("reading legal mail is a violation 
of the prisoner's privacy rights"). 
 Similarly, district courts in our circuit, like the one 
herein, have concluded that to read legal mail or to open it 
outside a prisoner's presence violates the Constitution, though 
they too have not agreed as to the constitutional rights at 
  
issue.  See Jordan v. Fauver, ___ F.Supp. ___, 1995 WL 139274, at 
*4-5 (reading legal mail in presence of inmate violates his right 
to court access) (D.N.J. 1995); Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 
F.Supp. 1048, 1052 (E.D.Pa. 1992) (opening and scanning outgoing 
attorney and court mail in presence of prisoner violates inmate's 
rights to petition, counsel, and court access); Thornley v. 
Edwards, 671 F.Supp. 339, 342 (M.D.Pa. 1987) (opening incoming 
court mail outside presence of inmate violates his rights to 
counsel and court access), mot. denied, summ. judg. granted, 1988 
WL 188333 (M.D.Pa. 1988); Carty v. Fenton, 440 F.Supp. 1161, 
1162-63 (M.D.Pa. 1977) (opening incoming court mail outside 
inmate's presence violates his right to court access). 
 Only once have we confronted the question of whether opening 
and reading an inmate's legal mail violates the Constitution.  
See Allen v. Aytch, 535 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1976).  We did not 
reach the issue, however, relying instead on Justice Brandeis's 
concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 
288 (1936) to remand for consideration of a non-constitutional 
argument not raised in the district court.  Allen, 535 F.2d at 
823. 
 A.  Freedom of speech 
 As Justice Holmes recognized years ago, "[t]he United States 
may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it 
carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of 
free speech as the right to use our tongues."  United States ex 
rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 
U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Thus the Supreme 
  
Court has generally treated interference with the mail as 
implicating the First Amendment right to free speech.  See Bolger 
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 & n.18 (1983); 
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965). 
   In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), the Supreme 
Court invalidated California prison regulations which provided 
for the routine censorship of inmates' outgoing personal 
correspondence, on the grounds that the regulations violated the 
free speech rights of the prisoners' correspondents.  416 U.S. at 
408 ("[w]hatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored 
correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's 
interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of 
freedom of speech").  See also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576-77. 
 In the years after Procunier and Wolff, however, the Court 
abandoned the distinction between the free speech rights of 
inmates and their correspondents on the outside.  Abbott, 490 
U.S. at 411, n.9 ("any attempt to forge separate standards for 
cases implicating the [First Amendment] rights of outsiders [and 
inmates] is out of step with the intervening decisions"). 
 Clearly, then, prisoners do not forfeit their First 
Amendment rights to use of the mails.  For example, prison 
officials violate a prisoner's First Amendment rights when they 
refuse to deliver incoming personal mail simply because it is 
written in a language other than English.  Ramos, 639 F.2d at 
581.  Similarly, officials violate the First Amendment when they 
refuse to deliver mail that allegedly could be emotionally 
  
disturbing to an inmate, in the absence of a psychiatric 
determination that the mail would indeed be upsetting.  Id. at 
581-82. 
 The Fifth Circuit has concluded that "[t]he precise contours 
of a prisoner's right to free speech are . . . obscure,"  Brewer, 
3 F.3d at 821.  However, we need not determine the exact outer 
limits of a prisoner's right to free speech, for we are satisfied 
that a pattern and practice of opening properly marked incoming 
court mail outside an inmate's presence infringes communication 
protected by the right to free speech.  Such a practice chills 
protected expression and may inhibit the inmate's ability to 
speak, protest, and complain openly, directly, and without 
reservation with the court. 
 Here, plaintiff's complaint alleged that on fifteen 
occasions defendants opened his legal mail outside his presence.  
In response to this motion, he supplied evidence documenting five 
instances in which his incoming court mail was opened in a three 
month period.  Defendants admit that on three of the five 
occasions documented by plaintiff, they did open his incoming 
court mail outside his presence.  Because we must view the facts 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party, 
and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, we conclude that 
there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable 
person to infer that there exists a pattern and practice of 
opening plaintiff's incoming court mail outside his presence. 
 Plaintiff also alleges that defendants censored his mail.  
In the context of the First Amendment and prison mail, however, 
  
censorship means altering or "withhold[ing] delivery of a 
particular letter."  Procunier, 416 at 417.  See Wolff, 418 U.S. 
at 576 ("freedom from censorship is not equivalent to freedom 
from inspection or perusal").  But see Taylor, 532 F.2d at 469 
(opening prisoner's mail is "indirect censorship").  Plaintiff 
points to only one occasion in which his mail was damaged, namely 
when the briefing schedule was cut.  We decline to hold that a 
single instance of damaged mail rises to the level of 
constitutionally impermissible censorship, and hence this 
allegation cannot withstand the motion for summary judgment. 
   B. Right to meaningful court access 
 The Supreme Court has held that "prisoners have a 
constitutional right of access to the courts."  Bounds, 430 U.S. 
at 821.  See also Johnson, 393 at 489; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577-80.  
The Court explained that the access must be "adequate, effective, 
and meaningful" to comport with the Constitution.  Bounds, 430 
U.S. at 822.  Yet, as the Fifth Circuit has observed, "[p]erhaps 
because their textual footing in the Constitution is not clear, 
these principles [of court access] suffer for lack of internal 
definition and prove far easier to state than to apply."  Morrow 
v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 1. Source of the right 
 The Bounds decision made only one reference to a particular 
constitutional source, describing the prisoners' complaint as 
alleging a violation of their "Fourteenth Amendment rights."  430 
U.S. at 818.  Since that decision, courts have concluded that the 
right arises under the First Amendment right to petition, 
  
Proudfoot, 803 F.Supp. at 1052; Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 
307, 310 (5th Cir. 1986); Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985); Milhouse v. 
Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981); Washington, 782 F.2d 
at 1139; the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Proudfoot, 803 
F.Supp. at 1052; Thornley, 671 F.Supp. at 342; Stover v. Carlson, 
413 F.Supp. 718, 722 (D.Conn. 1976); and the Due Process Clause. 
Jackson, 789 F.2d at 310; Nordgren, 762 F.2d at 853.  Adding more 
spice to the soup, the Supreme Court has referred to the "equal 
protection guarantee of 'meaningful access.'"  Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).  There is also a theory that 
meaningful court access is protected under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.  See Nordgren, 762 F.2d at 853.  We have 
previously noted the various theories, without making our own 
selection.  See Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1036, n.18. 
 a. Right to petition 
 The First Amendment's right to petition "has a pedigree 
independent of--and substantially more ancient than--the freedoms 
of speech and press."  San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 
443 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 735 
(1995).  In colonial times, it referred primarily to the power of 
the people to petition their legislatures.  In fact, a 
significant amount of colonial legislation was initiated by 
citizen petition.  Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1156 (1991).  See also Note, A 
  
Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress 
of Grievances, 96 Yale L.J. 142 (1986).3 
 In the modern era, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Petition Clause encompasses a right of access not only to the 
legislative branch, but to the courts as well.  California Motor 
Transport Co. v Trucking, Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); 
Bill Johnson's Restaurants Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) 
("the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First 
Amendment right to petition").  Thus in San Filippo we treated 
the filing of a lawsuit as implicating the Petition Clause.  30 
F.3d at 440, n.18.  In its most recent examination of the clause, 
the Supreme Court appeared to treat the right to petition as 
subsumed within the broad First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression.  McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (right 
to petition is merely "an assurance of a particular freedom of 
expression").  In San Filippo, in the context of public 
employment, we nevertheless distinguished between a petition and 
mere speech to hold that "filing a non-sham petition is not a 
constitutionally permissible ground for discharge."  30 F.3d at 
443.  We conclude that the First Amendment right to petition, as 
                     
    
3At the founding, the Petition Clause also implied a 
"congressional duty to respond."  Amar, Bill of Rights, 100 Yale 
L.J. at 1156.  In the Civil War era, however, Congress enacted 
rules abolishing the duty to respond, a change later sanctioned 
by the Supreme Court.  Note, A Short History, 96 Yale L.J. at 
164; Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465 
(1979) (per curiam) (constitution does not require government "to 
listen [or] to respond" to citizen petition); Minnesota State Bd. 
for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). 
  
currently interpreted, is a birthplace for the right of court 
access. 
 b. Right to counsel 
 The plain language of the Sixth Amendment is limited to 
criminal proceedings,4 and thus, for example, the Supreme Court 
has determined that the Amendment's guarantee of a right to 
counsel does not extend to habeas corpus proceedings, which are 
civil.  Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.  Moreover, in Wolff, the most 
recent Supreme Court examination of the status of a prisoner's 
legal mail, the Court held that "[a]s to the Sixth Amendment, its 
reach is only to protect the attorney-client relationship from 
intrusion in the criminal setting."  418 U.S. at 576 (emphasis 
added).  See also Taylor, 532 F.2d at 472.  Accordingly, as to 
civil actions, we conclude that the Sixth Amendment is not a 
promising place for genealogical research on the right of court 
access. 
 Here, plaintiff characterizes the five pieces of opened mail 
as regarding "a civil rights action" against prison officials.  
Pl.Br. at 2.  Two of the letters were apparently related to 
Bieregu v. Reno, No. 93-4894 (D.N.J.), a civil action.  In 
addition, the briefing schedule allegedly opened and damaged 
                     
    
4
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."  U.S.Const., Am. VI. 
  
concerned a civil forfeiture case.  Certainly plaintiff offered 
no evidence in response to the motion for summary judgment 
indicating that the opened mail involved a criminal proceeding.  
Thus we will explore plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim no 
further. 
 c. Due process 
 As noted, the Bounds decision characterized the plaintiffs' 
allegations of a denial of court access as arising under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  430 U.S. at 818.  In Procunier, the Court 
held that California's mail censorship regulations violated the 
"constitutional guarantee of due process of law [which] has as a 
corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to 
the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek 
redress for violations of their constitutional rights."  416 U.S. 
at 419.  See also Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) 
(invalidating prison official's refusal to mail inmate's habeas 
corpus petition); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576 (referring to "due 
process claim based on access to the courts").  Thus there is 
ample authority to conclude that among the progeny of the Due 
Process Clause is the right of court access. 
 We note that defendants are federal officials, so 
plaintiff's reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment is misplaced; if 
grounded in the Due Process Clause, his right of access arises 
under the Fifth Amendment.  We will construe the pro se complaint 
liberally, however, Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 44 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1989), and conclude that it alleges that the repeated 
  
opening of properly marked incoming court mail outside his 
presence has violated his Fifth Amendment right to court access.  
 2. Scope of the right 
 The Supreme Court's characterization of the right to court 
access as requiring "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access, 
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, provides only limited guidance as to the 
scope of the right's protection.  We have noted that "the Court 
did not define the term 'adequate' with specificity,"  Abdul-
Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1993); unfortunately, 
"[o]ur own application of Bounds has contributed only slightly to 
a more precise standard of 'adequacy.'"  Id.  See also Brewer, 3 
F.3d at 821 ("the precise contours of a prisoner's right of 
access to the courts remain somewhat obscure").   
 Although our decisions have primarily concerned the adequacy 
and accessibility of prison law libraries and legal staff, see  
Peterkin, supra; Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1988); 
Abdul-Akbar, supra, a few principles emerge.  Prison measures are 
to be evaluated individually and in sum.  Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 
203.  A court must determine whether the means of access "give 
prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed 
violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."  
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.  "'[T]he touchstone . . . is meaningful 
access to the courts.'"  Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1037 (quoting 
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823) (internal quotation omitted). 
   Relying principally on our decision in Hudson v. Robinson, 
678 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1982), the government contends that unless 
a prisoner is "actually denied" access to the courts, his right 
  
to meaningful access has not been violated.  Hudson, 678 F.2d at 
466.  See also Proudfoot, 803 F.Supp. at 1053, n.8; Walker, 4 
F.3d at 413 (opening incoming legal mail outside prisoner's 
presence does not violate right to court access unless "his 
position as a litigant was prejudiced by the mail tampering"); 
Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825. 
 This analysis ignores our later decision in Peterkin.  There 
we distinguished "ancillary" aspects of court access, which "may 
affect merely comfort or convenience without depriving a prisoner 
of access," 855 F.2d at 1041, from prison practices that are 
"central, not peripheral, to the right of access to the courts."  
Id.  The former require a showing of actual injury but the latter 
do not.  Id. at 1041-42. 
 In Peterkin we characterized as "ancillary" an action 
seeking to require the prison to supply gratis pads, pens, 
pencils, postage, and photocopying to prisoners who had funds in 
their institutional accounts sufficient to purchase the items.  
See Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1041-42 (discussing Kershner v. 
Muzurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982) (in banc)).  We also 
described as ancillary the issue in Hudson itself, where a 
prisoner sued because he was once required to wait ten days to 
have a document notarized.  Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1039, 1041-42 
(discussing Hudson, supra).  By contrast, the adequacy of a 
prison law library concerned issues central to the right of court 
access.  Id.   
 Plaintiff does allege he was injured by the damage to his 
briefing schedule, but he offers no evidence to establish that 
  
the damage obscured the dates, nor to dispute defendants' 
contention that he received a separate notice from the clerk's 
office pursuant to Third Circuit LAR Misc. 107.2(a), informing 
him that he had fourteen days to file a brief else the appeal 
would be dismissed.  We conclude that plaintiff has not 
demonstrated that he has suffered an actual injury regarding 
court access. 
 Nonetheless, and although the question is close, we conclude 
that repeated violations of the confidentiality of a prisoner's 
incoming court mail is more central than ancillary to the right 
of court access, and thus no showing of actual injury is 
necessary for plaintiff to establish that the right has been 
infringed.  We are satisfied that a practice of opening court 
mail outside an inmate's presence implicates a core aspect of the 
right.  Such conduct inhibits an inmate's ability to protect his 
legal rights in court and frustrates the principles of Bounds.  
Unlike free pens or slight delays in notarizing documents, 
interference with such mail threatens the primary, often sole 
means by which a prisoner can exercise his constitutional rights.  
Without assurances that legal correspondence, including both 
attorney and court mail, is confidential and secure, court access 
can hardly be effective, adequate, and meaningful. 
 In so holding, we distinguish between a single, inadvertent 
instance of an inmate's court mail being opened outside his 
presence, and a pattern and practice of such conduct.  
Notwithstanding our characterization that protection of court 
mail is central to an inmate's right of court access, and thus no 
  
actual injury need be shown in the face of a pattern and practice 
of opening such mail outside of the inmate's presence, we do not 
necessarily rule out the need to show such injury where the 
opening is isolated and inadvertent.  See Castillo, 990 F.2d at 
306-07 (allegations that three pieces of incoming court mail were 
opened outside inmate's presence states colorable constitutional 
claim); Washington, 782 F.2d at 1139 (distinguishing allegation 
that two pieces of legal mail were opened outside inmate's 
presence, which would indicate "continuing activity" and 
therefore constitutional violation, from "single isolated 
instance," which would not).  Cf. Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 
1367, 1370-72 (2d Cir. 1975) (single instance of legal mail 
opened outside presence of inmate does not violate Constitution), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976); Boyd v. Petsock, 795 F.Supp. 
743 (W.D.Pa. 1992) (same).   
 We need not specify a minimum number of instances in which 
properly marked legal mail is opened outside a prisoner's 
presence sufficient to eliminate the requirement of showing 
actual injury.  Determining whether a prisoner has demonstrated a 
custom or practice is a fact-bound inquiry. 
 Lastly, we note several distinctions that may clarify our 
discussion of the right of court access as applied to prison 
legal mail.  First, reading legal mail would appear to infringe 
the right of access even more than simply opening and inspecting 
it.  Second, as the Supreme Court noted, the only way to ensure 
that mail is not read when opened, and thus to vindicate the 
right to access, is to require that it be done in the presence of 
  
the inmate to whom it is addressed.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576-77.  
Third, interference with attorney mail probably infringes the 
right of court access even more than interference with court 
mail, whether the correspondence relates to a criminal 
conviction, a subsequent collateral proceeding, or a civil suit 
to protect an inmate's constitutional rights.  Of all 
communications, attorney mail is the most sacrosanct.  Thus, 
although the Sixth Amendment is not recognized as the repository 
for such a shield in civil matters, see Finley, supra, the right 
of court access guarantees the privacy of attorney-client 
communications.  See John W. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of 
Prisoners, 4th ed., at 40 (Anderson Publishing Co. 1991) ("A 
basic corollary to the right of access to the courts is the 
inmate's right to communicate with an attorney concerning the 
validity of his conviction or the constitutionality of conditions 
within the detention facility"). 
 We conclude that a pattern and practice of opening 
plaintiff's properly marked incoming court mail outside his 
presence impinges upon his constitutional rights to free speech 
and court access.5  This determination does not depend on the 
                     
    
5We add a note about the right to privacy, because plaintiff 
relies on the Fourteenth Amendment and the district court cited 
the decision in which Judge Reinhardt, in dissent, stated 
"reading legal mail is a violation of the prisoner's privacy 
rights."  Stevenson, 877 F.2d at 1443.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the right to privacy survives incarceration.  
Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-99.  See also Monmouth County Correctional 
Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).  Although authorized by §540.18, 
routine reading of purely personal letters from friends and 
family, those daily expressions of affection and love, may 
implicate an inmate's right to privacy.  Certainly personal 
  
mere violation by prison officials of §540.18 and Policy 
Statement §13(a), which by itself does not establish a 
constitutional violation.  Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 
332-33 (1986); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-94 (1984).  
 
 IV. 
 We turn next to the question whether a pattern and practice 
of opening plaintiff's properly marked incoming court mail 
outside his presence, which infringes his rights to free speech 
and court access, rises to the level of a constitutional 
violation.   
 In several decisions the Supreme Court has struggled to 
define the standard for review of prison regulations which 
impinge upon the constitutional rights of inmates.  Though the 
Court announced a fairly searching standard in Procunier,6 its 
later decisions in Turner and Abbott held that as to prison mail, 
                                                                  
information in the hands of prison officials may result in 
ridicule, harassment, and retaliation.  If prisoners are stripped 
of the right to communicate privately their love, their hopes, 
and even their grievances, then recidivism rather than 
rehabilitation is fostered.  Similarly, opening legal mail 
outside the presence of an inmate, giving rise to the reasonable 
inference that such mail is read, may also implicate the right to 
privacy.  We do not reach this issue, however, as plaintiff has 
not placed it before us. 
    
6In Procunier, the Court held that a prisoner's mail is 
protected "against unjustified governmental interference."  416 
U.S. at 408-09.  To justify interference, the government must 
show an "important or substantial governmental interest unrelated 
to the suppression of expression," id. at 413, and that the 
suppression was "no greater than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest involved."  
Id.   
  
the Procunier standard is "limited to regulations concerning 
outgoing correspondence."  Abbott, 490 U.S. at 413 (emphasis 
added). 
 In Turner, the Court applied a less rigorous standard for 
review of incoming mail, a standard which it applied in Abbott as 
well.  The Court in Turner held that "when a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is 
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests."  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  See also Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
at 349-50 (applying Turner reasonableness standard to regulations 
that restrict free exercise of inmate's religion).  The Court 
then identified several factors useful in evaluating 
reasonableness.  Id. at 89-91.  See also Abbott, 490 U.S. at 414-
18; Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (3d  Cir. 1987).  The 
Abbott Court acknowledged that the Turner standard is more 
deferential to prison officials than that of Procunier, but 
embraced the new test with the caveat that "a reasonableness 
standard is not toothless."  Abbott, 490 U.S. at 414.  See also 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 97 (ban on inmate marriage not reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests). 
 Though the case before us concerns an alleged pattern and 
practice of official conduct, rather than a prison regulation, 
application of the Turner standard is appropriate.  See Brewer, 3 
F.3d at 825-26 (applying Turner standard to prison practice, not 
regulation).  We also note that the government does not argue 
that the conduct alleged by plaintiff comports with Turner. 
  
 The first Turner factor asks whether there is a rational 
connection between the infringing prison practice and a valid 
government interest.  To justify interference with prisoner mail, 
officials typically invoke their interests in rehabilitation of 
inmates and institutional security.  See, e.g., Abbott, 490 U.S. 
at 415; Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 348.  First, in the absence of a 
determination by, for example, a prison psychiatrist that receipt 
of particular correspondence would disturb an inmate, we hesitate 
to conclude that the government interest in rehabilitation is 
served by opening incoming court mail outside an inmate's 
presence.  See Ramos, 639 F.2d at 581-81.  Second, the interest 
in institutional security is generally linked to mail on the 
supposition that correspondence may contain plans for escape or 
incite violence.  We recognize the validity of this substantial 
interest, but to argue that it is served on the facts of this 
case--to suggest that repeatedly opening incoming court mail 
outside the presence of an inmate advances a legitimate interest 
in institutional security--would overreach. 
 In addition, we note that prison officials themselves have 
long recognized that providing a confidential, reliable means for 
prisoners to communicate their grievances to impartial courts and 
government officials, and to obtain a fair resolution of those 
grievances, releases tension in the prisons and itself advances 
the state interest in maintaining institutional order and 
security.  See generally Ira P. Robbins, The Prisoners' Mail Box 
and the Evolution of Federal Inmate Rights, 144 F.R.D. 127 (1993) 
("Prisoners' Mail Box").  In 1929, for example, Superintendent of 
  
Prisons (and later first Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons) 
Sanford Bates wrote to the warden of the federal jail at Fort 
Leavenworth: 
 It seems to me important that the inmates in your 
institution should have some reasonable and dignified method 
of making known any real or fancied grievance that they 
might have.  An institution is a good deal like a steam 
boiler, and needs a safety valve occasionally. 
Prisoners' Mail Box, 144 F.R.D. at 143.  An understanding of the 
benefits of such a "safety-valve" persuaded prison officials that 
preserving the confidentiality of communications with courts, 
agencies, and legislators advanced, rather than frustrated, 
important penological interests.  Id. at 148-49, 153-54.7 
 Consideration of the second Turner factor, the availability 
of alternate means of exercising the rights at issue, also 
indicates that defendants' practice is not reasonably related to 
a legitimate interest.  Although other means of expression remain 
available to prisoners even when prison officials interfere with 
their general mail, Abbott, 490 U.S. at 417-18, we are not aware 
of means other than by way of uninhibited use of the mail for pro 
se prisoners to exercise their rights of court access. 
 Finally, the third Turner factor concerns the burdens of 
accommodating the exercise of prisoners' constitutional rights.  
To accommodate plaintiff's rights to free speech and court access 
                     
    
7Interestingly, though prison officials initially censored 
inmate correspondence to federal judges to ensure that the 
content was decent, respectful, and non-libelous, when federal 
judges and even the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed a 
preference for receiving prisoner mail unopened and unexpurgated, 
the Bureau of Prisons changed its procedures.  Prisoners' Mail 
Box, 144 F.R.D. at 155, 159-60. 
  
by opening his incoming court mail only in his presence places no 
burden at all on guards, prisoners, and the allocation of prison 
resources: it is what the regulations have required since 1985.  
See 28 C.F.R. §540.18 (1994). 
 We hold that the pattern and practice of opening plaintiff's 
properly marked incoming court mail outside his presence fails 
the Turner reasonableness standard and violates the Constitution.  
We acknowledge that our conclusion differs from that of the Fifth 
Circuit, see Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825, but note that it comports 
with the results reached by the majority of courts of appeals to 
consider these precise or similar issues, not to mention the 
results reached by our own district courts.  See Lavado, 992 F.2d 
at 609-10; Castillo, 990 F.2d at 307; Lemon, 931 F.2d at 1468; 
Washington, 782 F.2d at 1139; Jensen, 648 F.2d at 1182-83; Ramos, 
639 F.2d at 582; Jordan, ___ F.Supp. at ___, 1995 WL 139274, at 
*4-5; Proudfoot, 803 F.Supp. at 1052; Carty, 440 F.Supp. at 1162-
63. 
 As noted above, we are careful to distinguish between a 
single, inadvertent opening of properly marked legal mail outside 
an inmate's presence and a pattern or practice of such actions.  
The former may not infringe a prisoner's right to free speech, 
nor his right to court access absent a showing of actual injury.  
The latter, however, both infringes those rights and fails 
Turner. 
 
 V. 
  
 Even where a plaintiff can establish a constitutional 
violation, under the doctrine of qualified immunity government 
officials will not be liable if "their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  For a right to be clearly established, 
"[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right."  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 
(1987).  In contrast, if "the law is not established clearly when 
an official acts, he is entitled to qualified immunity because he 
'could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal 
developments.'"  In re City of Philadelphia, ___ F.3d at ___, 
1995 WL 88161, at * 16 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-19).  
Though here again the question is close, we conclude that 
defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. 
 There can be no dispute that the contours of plaintiff's 
rights under §540.18 and §13(a) of the Policy Statement were 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable prison official would 
understand that repeatedly opening plaintiff's incoming court 
mail outside his presence violates those regulations.  Although 
promulgation of a regulation will not constitutionalize its 
violation, §540.18 and the Policy Statement surely undermine any 
claim by defendants that they were unaware of their legal 
obligations in handling plaintiff's mail.  Thus the government's 
argument is reduced to the contention that while the illegality 
  
of their behavior was manifest, the constitutional magnitude of 
their actions was murky. 
   We disagree.  First, in Procunier and Wolff the Supreme 
Court made clear that the treatment of a prisoner's legal mail 
implicates constitutional rights to free speech and court access.  
The subsequent decisions in Turner and Abbott did not question 
that interference with prison mail infringed these constitutional 
rights; the latter decisions merely established that such 
infringement was constitutionally permissible if it was 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological purpose.  Here, 
defendants do not even argue that their conduct meets this 
standard. 
 Second, though numerous other courts of appeals have 
considered conduct akin to that alleged by plaintiff, no gaping 
divide has emerged in the jurisprudence such that defendants 
could reasonably expect this circuit to rule other than we do.  
See Lavado, 992 F.2d at 609-10; Castillo, 990 F.2d at 307; Lemon, 
931 F.2d at 1465; Washington, 782 F.2d at 1139; Ramos, 639 F.2d 
at 582; Jensen, 648 F.2d at 1182-83.  Only the Fifth Circuit has 
reached a contrary decision.  Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825; Walker, 4 
F.3d at 413. 
 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Castillo is particularly 
instructive.  There, a prisoner alleged that three letters from a 
federal courthouse were opened outside his presence.  Because 
three instances "may be indicative of ongoing activity," 990 F.2d 
at 306, the Seventh Circuit determined that the inmate had 
"presented a colorable claim" of a constitutional violation and 
  
reversed the district court's dismissal of the action.  Id. at 
307. 
 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Lavado is also relevant.  
There, the court denied summary judgment to defendant prison 
officials on the basis of qualified immunity where one letter 
from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was allegedly 
opened outside an inmate's presence and a second letter, from a 
state law department, was allegedly opened and read in his 
presence.  Lavado, 992 F.2d at 609-10.  The Sixth Circuit held 
that "it was clearly established at the time of the 
openings/reading in the instant case that prisoners' mail could 
not be opened or read in [an] arbitrary or capricious fashion."  
Id. at 610. 
 Third, the district courts in our circuit who have addressed 
the issue have consistently determined that repeatedly opening a 
prisoner's legal mail outside his presence violates the 
Constitution.  See Jordan, ___ F.Supp. at ___, 1995 WL 139374, at 
*5; Proudfoot, 803 F.Supp. at 1052; Carty, 440 F.Supp. at 1162-
63.  See also Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1197-98 
(M.D.Pa. 1992) (denying qualified immunity to prison officials 
who allegedly intercepted mail addressed to judges and court 
personnel). 
 Finally, the absence of a previous decision from our court 
on the constitutionality of the conduct at issue is not 
dispositive.  We have explained that the "clearly established" 
standard "require[s] 'some but not precise factual correspondence 
between relevant precedents and the conduct at issue.'"  In re 
  
City of Philadelphia, ___ F.3d at ___, 1995 WL 88161 at *25 
(citation omitted).  We think the facts of Castillo, Lavado, 
Proudfoot, and Carty enjoy a substantial "factual correspondence" 
to the circumstances here. 
 Thus, we conclude that though our court has not previously 
ruled on this precise issue, the contours of defendants' legal 
obligations under the regulations and Constitution were 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable prison official would 
understand that repeatedly opening plaintiff's properly marked 
incoming court mail outside his presence violates the 
Constitution.  Accordingly, we will reverse the district court 
order granting defendants qualified immunity from plaintiff's 
claims. 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, see note 
1, supra, and reverse in part the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment to all defendants on all claims. 
  
Bieregu v. Reno, No. 94-5719 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
 
 I agree that Bieregu has alleged a constitutional 
violation of his right to court access, and that the law was 
sufficiently established to preclude a finding of qualified 
immunity.  But I have doubts that Bieregu's free speech rights 
are implicated here.   
 First Amendment free speech rights are implicated when 
prison officials censor inmates' mail.  Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Thornburgh 
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).  But "freedom from censorship is 
not equivalent to freedom from inspection or perusal."  Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974).  Because it is far from 
clear that defendants censored Bieregu's court mail, I would base 
this holding on his constitutional right to court access. 
  Also, because Bieregu has not claimed his right to 
privacy was infringed, it is unnecessary to address this issue.  
  
 
